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Criminal Procedure

ing the Nevada Supreme Court's denial of an appeal or affirmation
of a death judgment unless the person sentenced to death obtains
either a stay in federal court 10 or a new stay of execution from the
Nevada Supreme Court. 11
BAS

10. See 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 223, sec. 1, at 491 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.491) (a
person sentenced to death must obtain a stay in the federal court to which an application for
a writ of certiorari or habeas corpus is made).
11. Id. at 491 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.491) (stay of execution from Supreme
Court obtained pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes sections 34 or 177). The Supreme Court
can issue a new stay of execution if a petition for the stay raises new constitutional claims
for relief or presents substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted and a valid
justification why the claim was not presented in a prior proceeding. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §
176.487 (1987).

Criminal Procedure; discipline program-male felons
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 176._, 209._(new); §§ 176.145, 176.158,
176.175, 176.205, 176.221 (amended).
SB 98 (Hickey); 1989 STAT. Ch. 780
(Effective September 1, 1990)*
Under Chapter 780 the court may require qualified 1 males, convicted of a nonviolent felony, to participate in a regimental discipline
program as an alternative to incarceration. 2 The program must include:

• See 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 780, sec. 12, at 1855 (enacting NEV. REv. STAT. § 176._)
(the program becomes effective on September 1, 1990, and the funds for the program are
appropriated to the department of prisons immediately).
1. See 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 780, sec. 4, at 1852 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. § 176._) (to
qualify, a convicted male felon must be at least 18 years old, never imprisoned as an adult
for more than six months, and otherwise be eligible for probation). See id. sec. 5, at 1853
(amending NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.145) (if appropriate, the presentence investigation must
contain a recommendation that the defendant undergo the regimental discipline program).
2. Id. sec. 3, at 1852 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. § 176._). See id. sec. 1, at 1852
(enacting NEv. REv. STAT. § 209,_) (Director of the Department of Prisons must establish
the program with the approval of the board of parole commissioners). See also NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 176.175 1 (1987) (amended by 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 780, sec. 7, at 1852) (definition
of board); 209.061 (1987) (definition of director). The court may require the defendant to
participate in the program before sentencing. 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 780, sec. 4, at 1852 (enacting
NEv. REv. STAT. § 176._), If the defendant satisfactorily completes the program after a
probation violation, he is to be returned to the supervision of the chief parole and probation
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(1) Incarceration in a facility; 3 (2) strenuous exercise; (3)

military drills; (4) assistance with job placement; and (5)
instruction in alcohol and drug abuse prevention, stress management, character building, and rational behavior. 4
After completion of the program the defendant must return to the
court for further sentencing. 5 Time in the program must be deducted
from the later imposed sentence. 6
COMMENT

Chapter 780 provides an alternative to incarceration for qualified
males only. 7 In the past many government statutes reflected traditional sex roles, and the U. S. Supreme Court treated gender-based
classifications with great judicial deference. 8 Early in the 1970's,
gender-based classifications came under closer constitutional scrutiny.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 9 stated that gender-based
classifications are subject to challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause. 10 In order to survive a constitutional challenge, a genderbased statute classification must substantially relate to the achievement of an important government objective. 11 The ultimate goals of
the Nevada Legislature in enacting Chapter 780 could be to alleviate
prison overcrowding and prevent new offenders from becoming permanent participants in the criminal justice system. While these goals
are important, the reasons for excluding females are unclear.
One possible justification for excluding women from Chapter 780's
provisions could be that the number of women inmates is too small

officer. !d. See also id. (failure to satisfactorily complete the program is a violation of
probation). See generally Rotman, Do Criminal Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to
Rehabilitation?, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1023 (1986).
3. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 209.065 (1987) (definition of facility).
4. 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 780, sec. 1, at 1852 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. § 209._).
5. !d. sec. 4, at 1852 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. § 176._). The defendant must be
returned to the court within 30 days if not eligible for the program, and must be returned to
the court no later than 150 days after starting the program. !d. The court may request reports
of the defendant's participation. !d.
6. !d. (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. § 176._).
7. See 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 780, sees. 1-6, at 1852 (enacting NEV. REV. STAT. § 176._).
8. See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92
YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Haft, Women in Prison, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 345 (1973);
Fabian, Women Prisoners: Challenge of the Future, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 173 (1980).
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
10. !d. at 75, 76. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I.
II. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (a successful constitutional challenge to a
statute that prohibited the sale of 3.207o beer to males under the age of 21 and to females
under the age of 18).
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to cost~effectively and conveniently operate a program for women. 12
The Supreme Court has said, however, that administrative convenience is not sufficiently substantial to justify gender-based classifi~
cations. 13 While prisoners generally are afforded less constitutional
protection than members of the public, 14 lower federal courts have
rejected convenience and cost~efficiency as justifications for treating
women prisoners differently. 1 ~
The Court has also rejected rationales for gender-based classifications based on stereotypical concepts for the proper role of women. 16
Thus, if the legislature's reason for excluding women is that they
belong in the home and do not need job placement assistance, or
that women cannot tolerate physical labor, Chapter 780 is not likely
to survive a constitutional challenge. 17
12. F11bian, supra note 8 at 171, 174 (1980) (although the arrest rate for women is rising
more rapidly than the rate for men, women still are only a small minority of the total prisoner
population). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1987 SoURCEBOOK OF C!uM. JUST. STATISTICS
499 (1988) (395,309 total inmates in United States while only 15,823 female inmates). The
percentage of female inmates In 1985 and 1986 in the United States was 80Jo. ld. at 482, In
N~!v"!da the total inm"!te popul!ltion W"'S 3129 but only 188 of the inmates were female. /d. at
499.
13, Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-199. See Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
151 (1980) (the court stated that the state's purpose of convenience was not enough to support
a statute which paid workers' compensation death benefits to all widows whose husbands died
in work-related accidents, but only paid benefits to a widower if he was disabled or dependent
on his wife); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (the court rejected
"!dministrative convenience "'S a justification for a statute which allowed a serviceman to claim
his wife as "' dependent regardless of whether she was in fact dependent, but only allowed a
servicewoman to claim her husband as a dependent if he was dependent on her for more than
one half of his support). See also Reed v, Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (the government
objective of reducing the workload on the probate courts was insufficient to sustain the
statutory gender-based classification for appointment of administrators).
14. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (lower standard of review for prisoners
under the equal protection clause).
15. See e.g., Canterino v, Wilson, 546 F. Supp, 174, 211 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (government
reasons such as preserving the state's limited resources or the limitation~ of a small womens'
prison cannot be used to justify denying women equal access to programs routinely provided
to men). In Canterino, the govemment argued that security was an important government
objective because they would have to make the programs co-ed in order to be equal. Id. at
212, The court rejected this argument as insufficient to justify unequal programs. Id. See also
infra notes 17, 25 (discussing Glover v. Johnson).
16. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (197S) (preservation of values based on old notions
of females as homemakers is not a reasonable objective for a statute which determines a
different "!ge of majority for males and females). See generally Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MicH. L, REv. 797 (1989),
17, See Glover v. Johnson, 478 f. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (cla~s action brought
by women prisoners claiming that the state's failure to provide them with academic and
vocational training opportunities equal to those of the men violated their constitutional rights).
The court concluded that the women's constitutional rights were violated because the opportunities for rehabilitation provided for women were inferior to those provided for men and
this action failed to promote state penal objectives of rehabilitation and reintegration of
inmates. Id. at 1087,1088. See generally Note, Denial of Work Release Programs to Women:
A Violation of Equal Protection, 47 S. CAL, L. REv. 1453 (1974).
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The U. S. Supreme Court has upheld gender based discrimination
in some cases. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 18 the Court permitted Congress
to require that only men register for the draft. 19 The governmental
objective was to facilitate drafting of combat troops, 20 and since only
men were eligible for combat, the male~only statute was substantially
related to the government's purpose.~ 1 Assuming the purpose behind
Chapter 780 is to alleviate prison overcrowding and decrease recidivism, excluding women from the program does not appear to be
closely tailored to the achievement of this governmental objective; a
gender~neutral statute would appear to be equally effective. Currently,
eight other states have similar programs enacted through genderneutral statutes. 2~ While regimental discipline programs were initially
provided for males only, five states now have programs for females. 23
Generally, the success of women in parole and probation is similar
to men; 24 if women are not provided with this program their recidi~
vism rate will remain constant or increase while male recidivism may
decrease.
Whether Chapter 780 will withstand constitutional scrutiny depends
on the governmental objectives and how the court views the relationship of gender classification to the objectives. Prison officials
and legislatures who provide vocational training and education to
males only in an effort to alleviate overcrowding anc:l reduce recidivism should be aware that substantially equivalent efforts may be
required for similarly situated females. 25
JMM
18,
19.

453

u.s.

57 (1981).

!d. at 83. S~t! also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 u.s. 464 (l98l) (a statute
making it a crime for a male to h:;w1;1 S\!X with a female under the age pf 18 was upheld as
constitutional because the; statute roughly equalized the deterrence on the sexes in order to
prevent teenager prej!nancies).
20. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981).
21. !d. at 77.
n. See LA. REv. STAT, ANN. § 15:574.S (West Supp, 1989) (intensive incarcerAtion apd
parole supervision program); FLA, STAT, ANN. § 9~8.04 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN,
§ 42-8-35.1 (Supp. 1988) (special alternative; Incarceration); 1988 Mich. Lc::gis. Serv. 286 (West)
(enacting M.C.L.A. § 771.3b) (special alternative incarceration); N.Y. CoiUWCTION LAW § 867
(McKinney Supp. 1989) (shock incarceration program); S.C. CooE ANN, § 24.13-910 (Law.
Co-op 1989); OIQ.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 22. §§ 996·996,3 (West Supp. 1989) (d!llllyed senten~:ing
program for young adults); Miss. CooE ANN. § 47-7-47 (Supp, 1988) (earnt:IJ probation
program).
23. CoUNCil, OF SrA'J'E GovERNMENTs, Spit-Shine ~nd J)ouble-Timf!: State Shook Incarceration Programs, C.S.G. BACKOROUNPER (compil1;1d by K. Marsha)! 1989) (the states that havt,:
programs for women are Louisillna, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, and South Car91ina),
24. Fabian, supr~ note 8 at 178.
25. Smolla, Prison Overcrowding and The Caurts; A Roadmap for t/ltl 1980's, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REv. 389, 420 (1984). See Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Mich.
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1984) (under the Equal Protection Clause, prisons must provide female inmates with substantially equivalent treatment and facilities as those provided to male inmates unless their failure
to do so is substantially related to the achievement of correctional objectives of rehabilitation
and reintegration). See also Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (privileges
that are routinely granted to male prisoners, but restricted or denied to similarly situated
females will not withstand constitutional scrutiny under the equal protection clause unless this
discrimination is substantially related to an important governmental objective).

Criminal Procedure; driving under the influence-sentencing
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 4.373, 484.3792, 484.3794 (amended).
AB 274 (Committee on Judiciary); 1989 STAT. Ch. 86

Existing law provides that any person 1 found guilty of driving
while intoxicated2 may apply for substance abuse treatment as an
alternative to incarceration. 3 Prior law delayed sentencing if the
applicant was accepted into a program. 4 Under Chapter 86, any
person who applies to the court for a treatment program shall be
sentenced immediately, but the sentence will be suspended for up to
three years while the offender undergoes treatment. 5
DA

I. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.3794 (amended by 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 86, sec. 2, at 197)
(treatment program only available for first or second time offenders within a seven year span).
2. See id. § 484.379 (definition of driving while intoxicated).
3. !d. § 484.3794 (amended by 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 86, sec. 2, at 197).
4. !d.
5. See 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 86, sec. 2, at 197 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.3794)
(sentencing will be suspended on condition that the offender is accepted to a treatment program
and satisfactorily completes the treatment in compliance with any additional terms of the
court). !d. If the treatment is not completed, the offender must serve the imposed sentence.
Id. If the treatment is completed satisfactorily, a reduced imprisonment term and fine will be
imposed. !d. See also NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.3794 1(c) (upon completion of a treatment
program, a first offender within a seven-year period is punishable by a jail term of one dayor 24 hours of community service; a second offense within a seven-year period is punishable
with a jail term of five days).
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